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In this paper, an attempt is made to look at the phenomenon of lying from a
dynamic perspective. First a few classic definitions of lying are considered
and  found  to  be  inadequate  due  to  the  methodological  assumption
characteristic of the static style of thinking which postulates that lying is a
stable mental  entity that is  formed in mind and afterwards projected into
discourse with the help of linguistic signs. An alternative approach to lying,
which is underpinned with the dynamic style of thinking, posits that lying is a
discourse formation which emerges in the joint effort of communicants and is
contextually sensitive and labile. It is shown that lying is a specific form of
stance, the latter being treated in the spirit of J. Du Bois as a linguistically
articulated  form  of  social  action  whose  meaning  is  construed  within  the
broader scope of language, interaction, and sociocultural value. Rather than
catalogue the features of lying, the dynamic approach focuses on the general
structure of evaluative, positioning and alignment processes which organize
the enactment of  lying in  discourse.  These processes  are  further  brought
together  in  the  parallax  model  of  lying,  parallax  being  interpreted  after
S. Žižek as an apparent change in the nature of the object resulting from the
change of the observer’s viewpoint. 
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Introduction
The  research history of lying goes back to ancient times, yet to date there is
no agreement among scholars on what lying is, how it is done, and what part
language and interaction play in the process. 
2Most  of  the  attempts  to  capture  the  essence  of  lying  have  been
underpinned with the representational theory of mind (Rorty, 1979), which
considers knowledge to be mental representation, cognitive mirroring of the
mind-external world. Accordingly, language is viewed as a means of symbolic
manifestation of complete thought which is ready to be ‘packed’ into words.
This  type of  rationality,  known as  classic,  is  static  in  its  very  essence.  It
focuses on the general and constant features of objects modelled in keeping
with the binary opposition principle. When viewed in this light, lying presents
itself as the weak member of the opposition “truth :: lying”, its characteristics
being the mirror reversal of the features of truth.
The dynamic style of thinking, which emerged in the last third of the
XXth century  as  an  alternative  to  the  representational  theory  of  mind,
revolutionized  the  scientific  worldview  which  had  been  dominant  for
millennia. The radical change was initiated by exact sciences. The theory of
relativity  and quantum physics  demonstrated  that  the  laws  of  Newtonian
physics work only in the ‘sterile’ environment of a stable equilibrium. Such
environment  can  hardly  be  found  in  real  life;  therefore,  natural  objects’
behavior usually differs from the one predicted by theories which model their
ideal states. 
This  is  especially  true  of  such  an  object  as  natural  communication
which is unfolding “within an ever-changing, multilayer grid of life processes”
(Bogusławska-Tafelska, et al. 2010: 22). This makes it an appropriate object of
ecolinguistic study, where language is treated broadly, as “activity in which
wordings play a part” (Cowley 2011: 3). This umbrella definition enables a
researcher  to  bring  together  a  number  of  related  concepts,  namely,
‘discourse’,  ‘conversing’,  ‘dialogue’,  ‘distributed  language’,  ‘situated
language use,’ ‘languaging’, etc. Viewing language in contexts of ecological
engagement calls for “joining the efforts of specialists of divergent disciplines
in  building  models  across  the  lines  of  divergent  methodologies”
(Bogusławska-Tafelska 2011: 10). 
3Being  a  widespread  communication  practice,  lying  shares  all  the
complexities inherent in natural communication. As we engage in lying, we
think,  talk,  use  our  body  (gestures,  gaze,  voice,  etc.),  use  texts  and
technological means (telephones, computers, etc.). Taking into account the
important role that all these diverse ‘embodiments’ play in enacting lying, its
study obviously calls for the ecological approach. 
The complexities of lying are further enhanced due to its ‘concealed
strategic nature’ (Habermas 1990). In simpler words, lying seeks to fulfill a
hidden agenda of the speaker, and thus is a variety of incooperative social
action. As such, lying presents a considerable challenge for researchers who
endeavor to model it. 
This  paper  attempts  to  meet  this  challenge  by  suggesting  a  labile
model of lying, the latter being viewed as a variety of stance. Drawing on the
interactional  model  of  ‘the  stance  triangle’  suggested  by  John  Du Bois,  I
suggest  a  dynamic  parallax  model  of  lying.  I  start  with  laying  some
groundwork by exposing the drawbacks of the feature models of lying. This
sets the stage for characterizing lying as a complex act of  stance-taking.
Then I articulate a number of issues connected with the concept of parallax,
after which I go on to characterizing lying as a parallax stance. At this point I
should note that the proposed model has been built deductively and thus is
in need for further empirical testing.  
1. Feature model of lying
Characteristics  of  lying are manifold and complex;  all  of  them have been
challenged from different  quarters;  for  recent  overviews see,  for  instance
(Fallis,  2010;  Mahon,  2009).  Some of  these characteristics  are  considered
below.
 Let us start with such feature as  the verbal form of lying. Although
most scholars hold that lying is enacted only by a verbal statement, some
claim that acting in an intentionally deceptive way (for example, pretending
4to be leaving but instead of that hiding and staying behind) counts for lying,
too. Some even hold that just remaining silent in certain situations may be
considered a lie. 
Another  important  feature  of  lying  is  believed  to  be  the  falsity  of  the  proposition.
Although  most  researchers  adhere  to  the  opinion  that  a  lying  utterance  harbors  a  false
proposition, some hold that it is also possible to lie by making an utterance underpinned with a
true proposition, as long as the speaker is motivated by a deceptive intention. 
The next characteristic of lying, which is mentioned by many scholars, is the knowledge
of the speaker that the proposition is false. Although most researchers hold that lying calls for the
speaker  to  know about  the  falsity  of  the  proposition,  others  contend  that  making  untruthful
statements to others with the intention to deceive is not lying if what one says happens to be true. 
Another parameter of lying as the speaker’s intention to deceive. Though many scholars
claim that in order to be called lying, the utterance should be motivated by a deceptive intention,
some hold that the latter is an optional feature, and that making an utterance underpinned with a
false  proposition,  under  some circumstances,  is  to  be  considered  lying,  whether  or  not  it  is
motivated by the intention to inform. 
The liar’s intention is not an elementary thing, either, so there is lack of
consensus on the compositional structure of the general deceptive intention
(and whether or not each of the sub-intentions is obligatory). Thus, although
most researchers hold that lying requires an intention to deceive  about the
contents of one’s untruthful statement, some hold that lying also requires an
intention  to  deceive  about  one’s  belief  in  the  truth  of  one’s  untruthful
statement.  According  to  them,  when  one  lies,  one  intends  not  only  that
others believe that what one says is true, but also that they believe that one
believes that what one says is true. Some (Simpson, 1992) go even further,
and hold that lying requires a third intention to deceive – an intention  that
others believe that one intends that they believe that one believes that what
one says is true.
Then  there  comes  a  requirement  that  the  one  duped  should  only  be  the  addressee.
Although most scholars hold that in order to lie, one must be addressing the dupe, some others
claim that it is possible to lie to eavesdroppers. 
5This list can be continued, but there is hardly any need to do so in order to see that the
whole enterprise of elaborating the definition of lying by extending the number of its features is
doomed to failure since people are highly creative in devising ways of deceiving others with the
help of words. An endeavor to formalize lying in this way amounts to an attempt to capture the
essence of human nature by making a checklist. 
There  are  grounds  to  believe  that  the  key  to  understanding  the  essence  of  lying  is
contained not in elaborating its static model, but in revising the epistemological procedure of its
analysis, in particular, considering the possibility of constructing a dynamic model.
2. Lying as stance-taking 
In  the  light  of  the  dynamic  approach,  lying  is  not  something  one  has,  i.e.  not  a  mental
representation, but something one does, i.e. enactment. Social actors can enact lying only jointly,
producing and interpreting it in a context of interaction.
In search for theoretical instruments needed to account for the enactment of lying, some
interesting parallels with the content of poststructuralist terms ‘doing identity’, ‘positioning’, and
‘stance-taking’  can  be  drawn.  These  terms  help  focus  attention  on  dynamic  aspects  of
communicative encounters, in contrast to the way in which the terms ‘speech act,’ ‘self,’ ‘role’,
etc. serve to highlight formal, static and ritualistic aspects (Davies and Harré, 1990: 44). 
Viewed at  a  dynamic angle,  lying comes out  as a variety of stance-taking. In a most
general way, the latter can be defined as “situated, interactional process actively engaged in by
language users communicating with each other” (Palander-Collin, 2008: 361). 
Lying is  a complex stance-act,  encompassing multiple facets of stance-taking at  once.
Below I explore these facets using Du Bois’ model of the emerging stance (Du Bois, 2007) as a
basis. In modelling the process of stance-taking, Du Bois attempts to answer three questions:
(1) who is the stancetaker; (2) what is the object of stance; (3) what stance is the stancetaker
responding to (ibid.: 146-152). In more general terms, Du Bois links these questions about stance
to the notions of stance subject, stance object, and alignment.
The subjects of the stance-act of lying. In the stance-act of lying, the first and the third
questions turn out to be inextricably linked since lying is in fact a ‘counterstance’. In other words,
lying becomes a psychological fact only in case there is somebody who sees through it.  The
6presence of such person – let us call him a shrewd observer – is an obligatory characteristic of the
situation of lying. Conversely, if a lie goes down with the dupe, it means that for him no lying has
taken place, hence, from his point of view, communication is cooperative. The status of a shrewd
observer  can  be  ascribed  to  the  addressee,  a  bystander  or  an  eavesdropper;  it  can  even  be
attributed at the meta-discourse level, for example, to the reader of a work of fiction who can see
that a certain character is lying to another character. The shrewd observer can even coincide with
the speaker who is telling a lie, reflecting on it. 
Hence,  the stance-act of lying is  inherently dialogic,  and that is  why Russian linguist
N.D. Arutyunova  calls  lying  ‘a  second-replica  phenomenon’  (Арутюнова,  1999:  662).  The
‘second replica’ is an agreed term which does not actually presuppose that it has a verbal form. It
can be a response to one’s own thought, irrespective of whether it is put into words or not, the
opinion of another communicant (worded or not), etc. 
The object of the stance-act of lying is not elementary, either: by ascertaining a lie, the
shrewd observer is evaluating not only the truth value of the proposition (false), but also the
sincerity  of  the  speaker  (insincere),  and  even  the  situation  on  the  whole.  In  addition,  by
ascertaining  lying,  the  shrewd  observer  may  express  not  only  rational,  but  also  emotional
evaluation of the situation (it is usually negative, though there may be exceptions, for instance,
white lie, Afro-American bargaining). 
By doing emotional and rational evaluation, the observer is said to position himself in a
certain way. Positioning is provisionally defined as the act of situating a social actor with respect
to his responsibility for doing evaluation and thus invoking sociocultural value (Du Bois, 2007:
143). The difference between the ancillary stance-acts of evaluation and positioning is accounted
for by the fact that the first one is object-centered, while the second one is subject-centered (ibid.:
158).  Thus,  evaluation and positioning are ‘reverse correlates’:  in  the stance-act  of lying the
shrewd observer positions himself as such by evaluating – usually negatively – the truth value of
the proposition, the sincerity of the speaker and / or the situation as a whole. 
As an illustration, let us consider a fragment from a work of fiction where a situation of
lying is depicted:
7“What did you just take? Give it to me now!” I stuck out my hand, actually expecting that
he would hand over whatever it was. Gary’s face was deadpan. “I  didn’t take anything. You must
be seeing things.”
“Bullshit  !” (Cameron, D. 2004. A Fugitive Truth. N.Y.: Avon. P.79).
In this  situation both varieties  of  evaluation – rational  and emotional  –  are  observed.
Rational  evaluation is  twofold: the observer  (the first  person narrator, who is  an investigator
present at the crime scene) does not believe, firstly, that the proposition of the utterance I didn’t
take anything is true; secondly, that her co-communicator (Gary) is sincere in denying that he has
taken something, since the investigator saw it with her own eyes. Emotional evaluation of Gary’s
behavior by the observer is negative.
 As this example shows, disagreement of the observer implies not only the disagreement
about something (the object), but also the disagreement  with someone (the other subject – the
liar). This aspect of the stance-taking – how the participants relate to one another in physical and
psychological  perspectives – is  called  alignment (Du Bois,  2007:  144),  or  footing,  in  Erving
Goffman’s terms (Goffman, 1981: 128). 
The alignment of the participants of the situation of lying is quite complex since their
perspectives are divergent: the one offered by the speaker is rejected by the shrewd observer. In
this, the alignment of participants in the situation of lying is different from that in a situation of
truth-telling with no intention to deceive, where alignment is convergent (Du Bois, 2007: 149).
Divergent alignment of participants, which is an inherent characteristic of the situation of lying,
suggests that the stance of subjects in the situation of lying is of a specific nature,  since the
situation is characterized by the absence of the ‘shared stance object’ (ibid.: 159). The essence of
stance in the situation of lying is best captured by the concept of parallax, which involves a
change in the perspective of viewing the situation by its participants (main or secondary) or even
the observers at the metalevel.
3. Lying as parallax 
Parallax is treated in physics as an apparent change in the position of an object resulting from a
change in the position of its observer (Webster). In the present-day humanities, parallax has come
8to be considered as an “ontological” metaphor which captures the way of perceiving the world in
its procedural, dynamic aspect – as an activity / process, and not as a stale result (Žižek, 2006). 
In discourse, parallax phenomena could be observed, for example, in situations which call
for a shift in the way a certain fragment of the world is viewed (reframing in Goffman’s sense
(Goffman, 1974). Joking, irony, metaphor, and lying are all instances of discourse formations of
the  parallax  nature.  Given  this,  lying  seems  to  be  a  suitable  testing  ground  to  explore  the
explanatory potential of the concept of parallax for linguistic research.
Dealing  with  parallax,  one  is  supposed  to  draw  a  distinction  between  the  “first
impression” and “the second impression”, which is that of interpretation. This dialectics deals
with the individual, subjective mode of conceptualizing the world: the hearer refuses to occupy
the position offered to him by the speaker. It means that he is not an ideal – obedient and non-
critical – receiver of the message, but a perceptive and personalized individual. 
Lying  is  about  seeing  the  situation  by  multiple  subjects  with  double  vision.  In
conceptualizing  lying,  it  is  best  to  put  the  emphasis  not  so  much  on  the  shift,  as  on  the
multiplicity of observational sites, the borderline between which is fuzzy to such an extent that
the gap can become indistinguishable.  An example here may be when the truth is  used as a
disguise, as when a spy, asked what he does in life, answers, ‘I am a spy’, only to be greeted with
laughter. 
Modes of parallax can be seen in different aspects of conceptualizing lying (or theorizing
about it). Firstly, there is the ‘ontological’ parallax  (Žižek, 2006) arising from the insincerity /
falsity duality of lying. Then, there is the parallax of the speaker’s and the observer’s stances (or
their  counterstance),  which  is  an  inherent  feature  of  lying.  And  finally,  there  is  the
methodological parallax between the static / atomistic / disembodied and dynamic / ecological /
distributed approaches to considering linguistic phenomena, lying in particular.
By way of conclusion, parallax is a vivid “ontological” metaphor which captures the way
of perceiving the enactment of lying in its procedural, dynamic aspect – as an activity / process,
and not as a stale result. Moreover, as compared to the most popular to date models of stance-
taking  (such  as  Du  Bois  “stance  triangle”),  the  parallax  model  allows  to  capture  divergent
stances, lying being one of them. 
Lying is  an undeniably complex discourse formation: it  is an ensemble of the acts of
evaluation, positioning and alignment of social actors in the situation of where their positions
9diverge. The analysis offered here is another proof to the fact that the ‘stances’ which are quite
commonly considered separately are but different facets of a complex act of stance-taking.
The process of their emergence is not rule-governed but is rather born in the interaction of
the content of the utterance with its environment in a broad sense. Yet this seems to be the task
for further research  with respect to a new understanding of how cognition, communication and
society interrelate.
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